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THE CASE FOR FIELD PREEMPTION OF STATE 
LAWS IN DRUG CASES 
Richard A. Epstein* 
INTRODUCTION: PREEMPTION IN FLUX 
Catherine Sharkey‘s essay, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption 
of State Law Product Liability Claims, represents an ingenious effort to 
work between the horns of the most pressing dilemma in today‘s law of 
federal preemption with her ―agency reference model‖ of preemption.1  This 
issue is hot today because the Supreme Court recently held in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc. that the Medical Devices Act preempted a plaintiff‘s state 
product liability claims alleging defective design of a balloon catheter after 
plaintiff suffered grievous injuries when the device ruptured inside his right 
coronary artery.2  It is worthy of note that here the treating physician made 
two controversial decisions:  (1) he used the catheter on a patient whom 
FDA warnings classified as unfit for the treatment; and (2) he overinflated 
the catheter.3  The problem of FDA preemption also arises in the context of 
a drug manufacturer‘s duty to warn in a case scheduled to come before the 
Supreme Court next year, Wyeth v. Levine.4  In that case, the Vermont Su-
preme Court upheld a damage award on the ground that Wyeth should have 
warned the plaintiff against using its drug, Phenergan, in a risky procedure 
that the FDA had explicitly authorized.  More specifically, the FDA-
approved warning label allowed Phenergan to be injected intravenously by 
a so-called ―IV push,‖ or rapid injection into a vein by syringe, so long as 
physicians were alert of the risk of hitting an artery instead of a vein.  The 
plaintiff suffered gangrene and consequent loss of a limb when the IV 
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  Id. at 1005. 
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―should not have allowed IV push‖—period.5 
To understand the legal issues raised by these two cases, it is useful to 
set the background with a thumbnail sketch of the modern law of preemp-
tion. All parties agree that some principles of interpretation are needed to 
work out the interrelationships between federal and state action that covers 
the same sphere of action.  It is understood as well that the law of preemp-
tion divides itself into two halves.  The first half deals with express preemp-
tion, which holds that if the federal government makes it clear—itself a 
term that turns out often to be unclear—that its statute preempts the state 
law, then the issue is over. Under the Supremacy Clause6 of the United 
States Constitution, the lowliest federal action trumps the most grandiose 
state pronouncement.  Conversely, if the federal statute makes it clear that 
the state law may peacefully coexist with it, a system of dual enforcement is 
appropriate. 
In many cases, of course, the question of preemption is not resolved by 
express preemption, at which point the common view holds that there are 
three possible grounds for implied preemption.  The strictest standard al-
lows for preemption only in cases of actual conflict, such that there must be 
a clear inconsistency between what the federal government and the state 
government each allow or require.  Second, it is often stated that the 
preemption in question only arises in those cases where the imposition of 
the state liability will frustrate the ends of the federal statute.  Finally, a 
third form of preemption argues that preemption does not require this form 
of explicit conflict, but is satisfied if it appears that the federal statute has 
occupied the field, blocking state efforts to impose sanctions within that 
field even if there is no explicit conflict.  For our purposes, the first and 
third forms of preemption are the most relevant ones.  Drug cases are more 
problematic than device cases because the Medical Devices Act does con-
tain an explicit preemption provisions for medical devices, in contrast to 
drug cases, which are subject to no explicit form of preemption.7 
Professor Sharkey‘s distinctive contribution to this debate is her careful 
elaboration of the ―agency reference model‖ of preemption, which enriches 
the debate over preemption by consciously incorporating administrative law 
principles resting on the twin pillars of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-





  Id. at 182. 
6
  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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  See Medical Device Amendments of 1976 § 521, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000) (link): 
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(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 
8
  467 U.S. 837 (1984) (link). 
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―agency reference model‖ treats Chevron and Skidmore as defining an ad-
ministrative universe in which the level of deference given an administra-
tive action increases with thoroughness and formality of the processes that 
generate the disputed ruling.10  Sharkey‘s proposal, elaborated with her cus-
tomary vigor and clarity in her article on Riegel, explains how the key in-
terpretive tools of the administrative state can shed light on the preemption 
question. 
This brief Comment renews my defense of strong field preemption for 
FDA regulation.  In Part I, I shall set out the emergence of modern preemp-
tion law in light of the vast expansion of federal power after the New Deal 
with special reference to two cases of great current concern, Riegel11 and 
Levine.12  Thereafter, in Part II, I shall comment first not on Professor Shar-
key‘s article, but on a recent essay by David Kessler and David Vladeck 
that takes the strong view that the doctrine of implied preemption should 
not be applied in duty-to-warn drug cases.13  Then, in Part III, I address Pro-
fessor Sharkey‘s agency model, and lastly, in Part IV, I offer a brief capitu-
lation of my field preemption position. 
I. PREEMPTION AFTER THE NEW DEAL 
Historically, the consolidation of the New Deal administrative state 
meant the federal government faced few, if any, limitations on the scope of 
its power given the expansive reading of the Commerce Clause.14  This rap-
id expansion of federal power took place in an environment highly sympa-
thetic to regulation at both the national and the state levels.  State powers of 
regulation have never been constrained by the federal constitutional doc-
trine of enumerated powers.  But post-1937, the broad construction of the 
Commerce Clause gave the federal government total power to regulate in 
areas formerly reserved to the states, except in the most marginal of cases.15 
                                                                                                                           
9
  323 U.S. 134 (1944) (link). 
10
  For a discussion of the various ins and outs of judicial deference to administrative decisions, see 
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Kreuger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1235 (2007) (link); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules 
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2002) (link). 
11
  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
12
  Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, 944 A.2d 179 (sustaining jury verdict), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 
1118 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008) (No. 06-1249). 
13
  David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt 
Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008) (link). 
14
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  For the classic defense of the expansive view of the commerce 
clause, see Robert Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 
(1946). 
15
  See Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor: Is Half a 
Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793, 1801–04 (2006).  The decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (link), struck down a statute that prohibited the possession of firearms within 1,000 feet 
of a school.  But in so doing it solidified the holding in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which 
is the current fount of federal power.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (―Our case law 
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Riegel and Levine offer an effective window around which to organize 
a discussion of preemption in the modern regulatory debate.  What should 
be done to ease the tension that arises when state and federal governments 
regulate concurrently, arguably in inconsistent ways?  We should not work 
ourselves into a deep philosophical funk that regards the federal govern-
ment as congenitally unable to speak with a clear voice.  Of course it can be 
done.16  However, as Sharkey rightly points out, passing federal regulation 
is not merely a grammatical exercise.  It is also a highly political one, where 
sides jockey for position on the key question of whether state actions will 
be allowed in an area once the federal government has entered the field.  
This tension is real enough when both the federal and state government act 
through regulation.  The federal statutes clearly preempt state ―require-
ments‖ resulting from direct legislative or administrative action.  The ques-
tion of whether common law actions that can compel action are preempted 
is much closer, and there has been some division of opinion.17  But the 
stakes are a thousand-fold higher when the question turns to whether the 
federal statute will trump state law tort causes of action that have expanded 
vastly since the adoption of the Second Restatement of Torts, which was 
published in 1966.  All too often Congress combines a provision that first 
preempts state law but then expressly preserves common law rights of ac-
tion.18  What‘s a judge to do when Congress tries to square the circle? 
Generally speaking, three schools of thought have arisen to deal with 
this question.  The first of these rests on what is commonly termed the ―pre-
sumption against preemption,‖ which means that all doubtful statutes 
should be construed in ways that do not block the imposition of additional 
sanctions at the state level.  Justice Douglas‘s famous passage in Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp. put it as follows:  
Congress legislated here [on the matter of warehouse receipts] in a field which 
the States have traditionally occupied.  So we start with the assumption that the 
                                                                                                                           
firmly establishes Congress‘ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‗class 
of activities‘ that have substantial effect on interstate commerce. . . . As we stated in Wickard, ‗even if 
appellee‘s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still . . . be reached 
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.‘‖) (quoting Wickard, 317 
U.S. at 125) (link). 
16
  Easy cases are in practice hard to find, in part because the only cases that make it to the Supreme 
Court have some genuine difficulty.  One candidate for the easy class is United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 
89 (2000), preempting various state efforts to impose comprehensive regulation of interstate vessels 
while in state waters. 
17
  Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (link), with Bates v. Dow Agros-
ciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (link). 
18
  See Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 1, at 416 n.5 (citing National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (2000) 
(preemption clause); id. § 1397(k) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2000) (savings clause); 
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (2000) (preemption clause); id. § 2074(a) (savings 
clause); Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2000) (preemption clause); id. § 4311(g) 
(savings clause)). 
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historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.  Such a pur-
pose may be evidenced in several ways.  The scheme of federal regulation may 
be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.  Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in 
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.  Likewise, 
the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obliga-
tions imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.  Or the state policy may pro-
duce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.  It is often a 
perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the 
choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States 
undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide.19 
This passage has a Job-like quality, for what the Court giveth in the 
first sentence—the need to show a clear and manifest purpose—it taketh 
away in the three enumerated exceptions.  Hence the tripartite debate.  Ern-
est Young argues that the Rice presumption should be broadly read to pre-
serve the historic role of the states in local regulation.20  This view favors no 
implied preemption. 
At the opposite extreme, according to the second school of thought, the 
arrival of federal regulation is held to transform the regulatory universe.  
This view, which I have defended with Michael Greve, insists that concur-
rent regulation mistakenly ratchets up government control so that the most 
intrusive regulator always wins.  It therefore adopts the view of field 
preemption: let the regulation cover the topic, and the state intervention is 
banned.21 The third position, which Sharkey champions, falls in the middle.  
It avoids the strong presumption against concurrent regulation and insists 
that there be some demonstration of an actual conflict before the state rules 
are shown.  Let us turn now to the various positions. 
II. THE KESSLER-VLADECK POSITION 
In their article entitled A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to 
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, Kessler and Vladeck begin their analysis 
of drug preemption cases by addressing institutional issues.  They claim 
that the FDA performs admirably but is constrained by limited resources, 
which leads to mistakes of wrongfully letting dangerous drugs onto the 





  331 U.S. 218, 230–32 (1947) (citations omitted) (link). 
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  Ernest Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES‘ 
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
21
  See Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES‘ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 
2007); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine and Its Limits, in 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES‘ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 309 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. 
Greve eds., 2007). 
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backstop to administrative failure by creating a second chance to correct the 
mistakes in the original FDA process.22  They further argue that this ex post 
review has significant advantages because it can rely on information about 
drug safety, side effects, and effectiveness that accumulates only after a 
drug is extensively used on the market.  As a textual matter, Kessler and 
Vladeck note that the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA)23 offers no safe harbor for pharmaceutical companies be-
cause it reaffirms their ability under the FDA‘s warning system to update 
their warnings based on newly acquired information.24  Finally, they pooh-
pooh the FDA‘s recent Preemption Preamble which announces its new-
found conclusion that its warning labels preempt any state law judgment to 
the contrary.25 
Initially, much of their proposal builds on the presumption against 
preemption, which gains strength from the obvious contrast between the 
Medical Device Act, which created preemption in Riegel,26 and the want of 
any preemption provision dealing with drugs, as in the Levine case. But 
even this point is not as clear as they claim.  Levine presents a situation 
where the FDA gave explicit approval to the exact treatment, notwithstand-
ing the precise side effect mentioned in the original warning.27  What would 
count as new information to render that explicit authorization obsolete? The 
mere occurrence of the identified side effect can‘t do it because it was 
warned of in advance.  And in Levine the sketchy record reveals no evi-
dence collected after the drug hit the market indicating a higher incidence of 
this failure (and perhaps others) that might call for a reevaluation of the 
risk/reward ratio for that procedure.  But making that determination is hard 
because new information comes in dribs and drabs, ruling out some defin-
ing moment at which the new warning is mandated.  Extensive litigation 





  Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 13, at 467, 477, 483–95. 
23
  Pub. L. 110-85, 120 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (link). 
24
  See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 13, at 468–69. 
25
  Id. at 473–74.  For a critical discussion of the FDA maneuver, see Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 
227 (2007). 
26
  See David Vladeck, Summary of Remarks to Medical Device Preemption Conference Partici-
pants (July 22, 2008) (discussing Professor Vladeck‘s rejection of Riegel) (upublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
27
  On this point, the evidence seems powerful:  
The bottom line is that the Levine Court upheld common-law actions for negligence and failure-to-
warn in the face of not one, but two, specific determinations by the FDA regarding the precise re-
gulated risk.  The FDA-approved label warned of the risk of harm that transpired in the case . . . 
[and,] [a]fter initial approval, the manufacturer proposed a different warning to the FDA . . . and 
was told to ―[r]etain verbiage in current label.‖ 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 449, 507 (2008), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwlr/issues/pdf/Sharkey_76-3.pdf 
(link). 
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decried.  The FDAAA does not solve that issue. 
In addition, the structural flaws in the Kessler-Vladeck approach are 
still more profound because of the simplistic way that they integrate the lit-
igation process with the FDA approval process.  Kessler and Vladeck con-
sider only one kind of error in the drug approval process: its willingness to 
allow dangerous drugs, like Vioxx, on the market.  But two kinds of errors 
are evident: letting drugs on the market that should be kept off and taking 
drugs off of the market that should be left on.  The FDA is buffeted with 
strong criticisms as many scholars and industry observers deplore its risk-
averse attitude.28  I recently helped organize a conference on the FDA role 
in oncology cases with the American Enterprise Institute, where oncology 
experts reinforced this point by claiming that the FDA did not have the ex-
pertise to do state of the art review.29  Kessler and Vladeck are wrong to 
suppose that the undermanned and intellectually outgunned FDA will simp-
ly roll over by allowing new treatments onto the market.  Quite often these 
insecurities translate into a systematic reluctance to let many drugs on the 
market, lest the agency has to pay a political price if something goes wrong.  
That cautious form of institutional protectionism translates into ever longer 
clinical trials and administrative delays.  All in all, the real risk is that too 
few drugs will reach the market, not too many. 
After recognizing these two forms of error in regulation, the role of lit-
igation in the FDA approval process is even more problematic.  Where the 
FDA incorrectly blocks a drug from entering the market, litigation can do 
nothing to correct that error.  Where the regulatory process lets drugs cor-
rectly on the market, litigation remains costly even if it vindicates the de-
fendant.  Worse still, litigation has disastrous consequences if safe and 
useful drugs are subject to extensive tort liability.  Yet Kessler and Vladeck 
consider only the scenario where the permit is incorrectly granted, and liti-
gation rightly imposes liability, presumably at the right financial levels.  
Why ignore those possibilities, where judicial intervention through the tort 
system may only compound the errors of an overly harsh regulatory re-
gime?  In evaluating the role of the tort system, it is wrong to consider only 
those instances where it may do some good, albeit at a high cost, while ig-
noring the frequent instances where its use is either costly or harmful.  The 
complete analysis must cover all possibilities. 
At this point, we must ask whether the error rates in litigation will be 
low enough to make their system work.  Probably not, for a number of rea-
sons.  First, litigation comes too little, too late.  The drugs that usually gen-





  See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Taps Chief for Drug Center Amid Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 11, 2008, at B10; Peter Loftus, Drug Approvals Hit Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2007, at B5A. 
29
  For more information on this conference, entitled Oncology Drug Development: Rethinking FDA 
Oversight, including event materials and audio and video recordings, please see the AEI website, 
http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1666,filter.all/event_detail.asp (link). 
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withdrawn before litigation commences.  Indeed the plaintiffs‘ bar rightly 
free rides on FDA determinations, reducing the social gain from litigation. 
Second, Kessler and Vladeck do not defend the soundness of the cur-
rent tort system whose problems are legion.  Litigation does not simply ask 
if FDA warnings are adequate.  It must also decide knotty questions of cau-
sation: did this drug, or the excess amounts of the drug, cause the plaintiff‘s 
malady?  Would the needed information have changed the plaintiff‘s deci-
sion to use the drug?  These questions are hard to disentangle for plaintiffs 
suffering from multiple ailments treated by multiple drug regimens.  Often, 
no one knows for sure if a particular drug has been taken at all, taken in the 
right amounts, at the right time, or in the prescribed fashion.  Likewise, lia-
bility determinations cannot isolate the effect of a given warning in any in-
dividual case.  In contrast, the preemption rule forces the ex ante 
determination of the relevant issues, free from the distractions of any com-
plex tort litigation. 
The fact patterns of Riegel and Levine illustrate some of the complica-
tions in using the litigation process.  In Riegel, the treating physician in-
flated the balloon to ten atmospheres of pressure when it was only rated at 
eight atmospheres.  He also used the balloon in a patient who was not rated 
as a suitable candidate.30  Does his decision to ignore the label restrictions 
qualify as medical malpractice?  Not if the decision was made by conscious 
choice instead of simple neglect.  If other treatments have little chance of 
success, the doctor may rightly decide to take a long-shot by ignoring the 
warnings, and the jury may decline to impose malpractice liability.31  So 
forget about preemption for the moment—does it make sense to hold the 
manufacturer liable for the physician‘s choice because the outcome may 
have been unforeseen, or even foreseen but consciously disregarded?  We 
are not dealing here with teenagers who speed on tires rated for 80 miles per 
hour.  We are dealing with devices that go through professional channels 
such that the upstream player should never be held accountable for the mis-
takes of the downstream players.  If a state law finds liability, should Med-
tronic now rate its balloon for use only at six atmospheres—and run the risk 
that the people in the seven and eight atmospheres category will go without 
treatment?  No way. 
Similarly, in Levine, we know that the risk of arterial puncture is ever 
present.  But who has better knowledge of the magnitude of the risk in a 
particular patient, the company that supplies Phenergan or the physician 
who can look at the condition of the patient‘s veins and arteries?  These var-
iations matter because they show that the physician is in the best position to 





  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005 (2008). 
31
  See, e.g., Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean County, 706 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1998) (holding that disre-
garding standard instructions on use of Ciprofloxacin is not conclusive evidence of medical malpractice) 
(link). 
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others.  It is in fact dangerous for the company to recommend that all physi-
cians avoid the IV push if the other treatment options turn out to be more 
dangerous.  The field preemption rule thus protects patients from the syste-
matic errors of the tort system.  On policy grounds, nothing commends the 
Kessler-Vladeck proposal. 
III. SHARKEY‘S AGENCY MODEL 
Sharkey‘s agency proposal is superior to the Kessler-Vladeck position 
because of its greater willingness to accept conflict preemption.  Therefore, 
her proposal would allow Wyeth to keep its case from the jury if the partic-
ular point in dispute was subjected to intensive agency review.  In her 
words, ―courts need a fine-grained account of the precise regulatory review 
conducted by the agency and evidence as to its compatibility with state law 
tort claims.‖32  Moreover, that inquiry cannot be made on a blank record, 
but is intended ―to facilitate input from federal agencies on these issues.‖33  
In doing so, ―it is critical to discern whether the FDA has weighed in on the 
precise risk the state tort action likewise seeks to regulate.‖34  In the end, her 
position leads to Skidmore deference, which asks whether the agency de-
termination has the ―power to persuade.‖35  This deference in turn depends 
on ―the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reason-
ing, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.‖36 
Sharkey‘s proposal thus allows the FDA to insert itself between a drug 
manufacturer and tort liability.  But its flexibility comes at too high a price.  
The successful application of the Skidmore standard depends in large meas-
ure on the number of occasions in which its far-reaching inquiry is needed.  
Skidmore involved a one-and-done dispute over whether all workers who 
were required to be on-call at night were entitled to overtime pay under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.37  The case needed a single fact determination, 
without obvious repetition. The administrative agency only made one key 
decision about basic policy, which was done without any knowledge of, or 
concern with, the facts and circumstances of any particular case.  Skidmore 
decided only that the Administrator‘s rulings had to be taken into evidence 
in the case, where it was entitled to some respect.38 
Those burdens are trivial compared to wading through the normal 
complex FDA record.  In addition, this onerous task would have to be done 





  Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 1, at 418. 
33
  Id. 
34
  Id. at 423. 
35
  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
36
  Id.  See also Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 1, at 424 n.48. 
37
  29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (link). 
38
  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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up the possibility of third-party depositions of present and past FDA em-
ployees, and extensive discovery of FDA doctrines.  Skidmore is not scala-
ble, and its huge protracted battles over preemption may only be a prelude 
for the underlying litigation.  The simplest approach in these cases is to fol-
low the kinds of information that was introduced in Skidmore, namely a 
broad statement of policy.  In this context, this approach would exclude all 
the particular FDA judgments in reviewing the drug, but not the Preemption 
Preamble, which would be admissible to give some indication of the FDA‘s 
policy.  Without this sort of restriction, the Sharkey inquiry in Levine could 
collapse into the approach of Kessler and Vladeck, barring preemption 
across the board. 
The Sharkey proposal would also undermine long-term administrative 
stability.  As she duly notes, my earlier piece on preemption describes the 
dangers of agency flip-flop, often in response to intense lobbying pressures 
from all sides.39  For example, if the Preemption Preamble tipped the bal-
ance in favor of preemption under Skidmore, that precarious result could be 
gone with the next change of the guard in the White House or the FDA.  
Given the billions of dollars at stake, that flip-flop will not be a simple ran-
dom event.  It will be a target of opportunity that will embolden lobbyists of 
all stripes.  Those changes flout any notion of a rule of law as a set of stable 
social expectations.40 
Finally, Sharkey‘s proposal does not correct the deficient error-cost 
analysis in the Kessler-Vladeck plan.  Nor does it take into account the 
substantive weaknesses of the current duty to warn law in most states, with 
the high risks of false positives on liability.  The proposal‘s ex ante effects 
are also likely to deter new drug innovation by adding private law sanctions 
to the impressive administrative obstacles that now impede new drug de-
velopment.  Finally, its helter-skelter results undermine the uniformity that 
grounds the public acceptance of the law. 
IV. FIELD PREEMPTION 
By process of elimination, only field preemption remains standing.  I 
shall not rehearse the case for this position again here.41  However, I do 
wish to add one point that I have since developed elsewhere.  It is a mistake 
to think that the only ways to secure public health are through some combi-
nation of sanctions through the FDA permit system and the tort system.  
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termediate organizations such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Net-
work, which supervises the clinical use of off-label drugs, i.e. those which 
are taken for one indication, although they actually received FDA approval 
for another.42  This voluntary system is quick on the uptake and gets infor-
mation on adverse events out to the profession faster than the dilatory FDA 
processes and the interminable tort litigation.  So, it seems unwise to handle 
the issue of drug information by coercion when persuasion is still available.  
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